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Abstract
This paper studies the effect of incentive schemes incorporating status classes on
workers’ performance. I focus on performance comparisons between similarly skilled
workers that belong to different status classes. A theoretical framework predicts that,
under certain conditions, low ability workers attain high performance when they are
assigned to a high rather than a low status class, and that high ability workers achieve
high performance irrespective of the received status. These predictions are tested in a
laboratory setting, where subjects are randomly assigned to a high status or a low sta-
tus condition and constant performance feedback is provided. The experimental data
support both predictions: low ability subjects assigned to the high status condition
outperform their low status counterparts by 0.53 standard deviations in a cognitively
challenging task, and high ability subjects display high performance outcomes in both
status classes. Moreover, I explore the subjects’ beliefs about performance as a mech-
anism to explain these results. I find that low ability subjects assigned to the high
status exhibit performance targets that were as high as those elicited by high ability
participants. This suggests that these workers used status to believe that they were
good performers, and performed accordingly.
JEL Classification : D03, C91, D84, M54, Z13
Keywords: Performance, Status, Beliefs, Experiments, Cognition.
This paper benefited greatly from the suggestions and comments made by my advisors Patricio S. Dalton,
and Charles N. Noussair. I thank Florian Schuett, Nathaniel Wilcox, Gabriele Camera, Sebastian Dengler,
and Emanuel Marcu for helpful comments and suggestions. I am also grateful to the participants at Tilburg
University, Chapman University, and the University of Arizona seminars, the SABE/IAREP 2016 conference
and the 15th TIBER conference for their feedback. This study was funded by CentERLab.
Tilburg University, Tilburg School of Economics and Management. 5000 LE TILBURG The Netherlands
(e-mail: v.h.gonzalezjimenez@uvt.nl)
1 Introduction
The taste for status is inherent in human nature.1 High social status is desirable from a
neurobiological perspective, as it activates the rewards-related neural circuitry (Dohmen
et al., 2011), as well as from an evolutionary standpoint, since it increases the likelihood
of survival and reproduction in animal species.2 This hard-wired quest for high status
influences economic decision-making as documented in empirical, as well as in theoretical
work (Ray and Robson, 2012; Hopkins and Kornienko, 2009; Fliessbach et al., 2007; Ball
et al., 2001; Neumark and Postlewaite, 1998; Oswald, 1997; Robson, 1992).
The framework considered in this paper is an agency setting, in which the principal is
aware of the agent’s taste for status and diverts this concern to pursue his own benefit.
Particularly, the principal attains high levels of effort provision by offering a labor contract
that complements standard monetary incentives with a status class or a relative standing as
suggested by Besley and Ghatak (2008), Moldovanu et al. (2007), and Auriol and Renault
(2008).3 There is empirical literature supporting the effectiveness of this practice in settings
in which high status is treated as the provision of a non-financial reward (Bradler et al.,
2016; Bareket-Bojmel, 2014; Neckermann et al., 2014; Ashraf et al., 2014; Kosfeld and
Neckermann, 2011) or a high standing on a relative performance ranking (Charness et al.,
2014; Kuhnen and Tymula, 2012; Azmat and Iriberri, 2010).
While the effect of these status incentives on the agents’ performance has been exten-
sively investigated, most studies focus on performance measures when the allocation status
is anticipated by the worker and depends on her performance. However, relatively little
attention has been given to the effect of an unanticipated provision of status incentives on
subsequent performance.4 Understanding such effect is critical to comprenhend how these
devices affect the motivation of individuals endowed with certain abilities on a productive
task. In different words, studying status incentives in an environment in which workers do
not expect them and do not deserve them, allows managers to evaluate how these devices
alter the performance of workers that belong to different points of the skills distribution.
The focus of the present paper is the effect of status incentives on workers’ performance.
I devote attention to the performance comparison of individuals with similar abilities on a
1In this paper social status is defined as the position in a ranked ordered structure, determined by a
shared standard of value of the involved actors (Ridgeway and Walker, 1995).
2Status seeking behaviors are documented in diverse non-human animals such as apes (de Waal, 2007),
bonobos (Hohmann and Fruth, 2000), hens (Schjelderup-Ebbe, 1935) and ants (Regnier and Wilson, 1971).
3An example of such contracts are the employee recognition programs, such as “ Employee of the month”
award used by McDonald’s, where on top of his monetary compensation the worker receives recognition
when his performance is outstanding.
4Some exceptions include Bradler et al. (2016) who study in a field experiment the effect of an unantici-
pated reward on performance in a data-entry task and Neckermann et al. (2014), who in a quasi-experimental
setting find that awards boost subsequent performance outcomes in a call-center.
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task but belonging to different status classes. To that end, I focus on an allocation in which
status class is randomly assigned. Such an allocation facilitates the intended comparison as
workers across the whole spectrum of abilities have identical chance to belong to a status
class. My hypothesis is that status influences agents’ beliefs about their performance on
the task, which can alter their actual performance when incorporated in their preferences
as in Köszegi (2006), Compte and Postlewaite (2004), and Caplin and Leahy (2001).
I begin with a theoretical framework, presented in section 2. The model builds upon a
standard agency model in which the agent faces a pay-for-performance incentive scheme. In
the benchmark scenario, the agent holds standard preferences over effort choices and knows
her abilities on the productive task. Thus, status, a random binary signal provided by
nature before reaching the production stage, does not alter effort exertion. The prediction
of this benchmark is that high ability individuals should, irrespective of their status, exhibit
higher performance outcomes as compared to low ability individuals.
I depart from the benchmark by introducing two concepts from behavioral economics:
i) anticipatory utility (Caplin and Leahy, 2001), which introduces the possibility that the
representative agent experiences utility caused by the feelings derived from thinking about
her future payoff, and ii) information distortion (Benabou and Tirole, 2002), which is the
idea that the agent could, at a cost, forget relevant information. This scenario provides an
environment in which agents could engage in strategic self-deception, a situation in which
an individual could forget her true type to derive utility gains from believing, whenever it
is convenient, in the realized status signal. The prediction of this scenario is that agents
that have high abilities or, alternatively, a high status class exert high effort levels.
I investigate the predictions of the model in a controlled laboratory setting. Section 3
provides a description of the experimental design, which is based on Eckel and Ball (1996)’s
protocol. Subjects are randomly assigned to one of two conditions: A high status condition
and a low status condition. Moreover, a cognitively challenging task, the Progressive Ravens
Matrices test, is implemented both before and after the status assignment took place.5 The
first implementation was used to classify subjects into high types or low types according to
their cognitive abilities, and the second one measured cognitive performance after the status
assignment and when monetary incentives are at stake. Private feedback about personal
performance is constantly provided in each stage of the experiment. This design enables
the measurement of cognitive performance before and after the status class assignment.
In section 4, I discuss the results of the experiment. The primary finding is that subjects
classified as having low abilities and assigned to the high status condition outperformed their
counterparts in the low status condition by 0.53 standard deviations. Moreover, this differ-
5The Progressive Ravens Matrices test, is a non-verbal task typically used in the literature of psychology
to measure fluid intelligence, or the ability of a subject to perform novel tasks.
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ence is large enough to even out the average performance outcome of low ability subjects
with that of high ability ones. This result is consistent with the self-deception scenario, in
which in spite of having information about their abilities in the task, status is used strate-
gically by the low type agents to derive utility gains, which in turn raises performance. A
heterogenous treatment effects analysis shows that the lower are the skills of a participant,
the higher is her subsequent performance when assigned to the high status.
In the spirit of a robustness test, an additional experiment is conducted. This exper-
iment’s design presents one variation with respect to the original one: status classes were
awarded on the basis of cognitive abilities. One would expect that if low ability subjects
achieved high performance by means of the high status, then under this new system they
will exhibit lower performance as compared to high types. Indeed, the data show that high
ability subjects outperform by a significant margin low ability subjects. This constitutes
further evidence that the high performance achieved by low types in the first experiment is
due to the assignment to the high status.
During the original experiment, subjects were asked to state their production targets
or goals before and while completing the Raven’s matrices. In section 5, I use this data to
analyze whether status had an effect on these targets. The data display that low ability
subjects assigned to the high status class sat higher targets as compared to their counter-
parts in the low status. What is more, even though their abilities in the task were low and
this knowledge was reinforced by the constant feedback about their performance, their tar-
get levels were comparable to those classified as having high abilities on the task. In other
words, low ability subjects believed that they were not that bad when they were assigned to
the high status. This is once again in line with the the self-deception scenario, in that low
types use the high status signal strategically to convince themselves that they are skilled.
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, it relates to the empiri-
cal literature that studies the effect of non-financial rewards on performance. This study
supports the findings of Bareket-Bojmel (2014), Ashraf et al. (2014), and Kosfeld and Neck-
ermann (2011) as it shows that a non-financial status reward leads to improvements in the
perfomance outcomes. However, in stark difference with these papers, the non-financial re-
ward in this study is unanticipated by the agents and is given to them at the pre-production
stage. Thus, the results of this study show that these incentives are effective in boosting
workers performance even when they are provided at the pre-production stage. Further-
more, I complement the results of Bradler et al. (2016), and Neckermann et al. (2014) as
I show in a controlled laboratory setting that the provision of a non-financial reward with
a short recognition ceremony raises the performance outcomes of unskilled individuals in a
cognitively challenging task.
Second, it relates and contributes to the literature of self-image in economics. The
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theoretical model considers a game of self-deception similar to that presented in Benabou
and Tirole (2002). However, in my framework the representative agent holds standard
time preferences and it is through the inclusion of anticipatory utility in her preferences
that there is a strategic interaction between the agent’s selves (Benabou, 2015; Caplin and
Leahy, 2001). Furthermore, another difference is that in my model the agent receives, in
addition to an informative signal about her type, a random binary status signal provided
by nature, which if favourable can be used strategically to replace an eventual unfavourable
informative signal about her type and in this way maintain high beliefs about her future
performance.
Also, the experimental results lend support to the empirical finding that individuals in-
corporate differently favorable and unfavorable news about themselves in their belief system
(Eil and Rao, 2011; Mobius et al., 2014). In my experiment, low ability subjects internal-
ize the assignment to the high status; they exhibit higher average performance beliefs as
compared to their counterparts that received the low status. However, high ability subjects
do not internalize the assignment to the low status; high ability subjects belonging to both
status classes exhibit high performance beliefs. A prominent difference with respect to the
existing literature is that my experimental design measures beliefs about absolute perfor-
mance rather than beliefs about relative performance. The advantage of this measurement
is that it illustrates in an straighfoward manner the influence of status on the subject’s
confidence to execute the task.
Fourth, this research adds to the literature that studies the effect of social status on
economic decision making in experimental settings. The experiment presented in this paper
is based on the design of Eckel and Ball (1996) and is also implemented by Eckel and Wilson
(1998), Ball et al. (2001), Kumru and Vesterlund (2010), and Eckel et al. (2010). As in
those papers, a status class consists of a non-monetary item, a medal, given to half of the
subjects. However, the design of this study differs from these studies in that a cognitively
challenging task is employed before and after the provision of the status class. Hence, this
experimental protocol aims to investigate the causal evaluation of the impact of the status
assignment on cognitive performance.
Finally, the paper contributes to the literature of goal-setting in economics. Research
on goal setting states that a challenging goal set by the principal can boost the agent’s
performance (Wu et al., 2008; Corgnet et al., 2015). Besides, theoretical models have
shown that personal goals could address self-control problems that stem from present-biased
preferences (Koch and Nafziger, 2009, 2011), and empirical evidence has shown that binding
personal goals could be motivating and lead to high performance levels as compared to
contracts that carry comparable monetary rewards (Dalton et al., 2015; Goerg and Kube,
2012). My contribution to this literature is twofold, first the results of this experiment
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show that the assignment to different status classes has an effect on production targets.
Specifically, the assignment to the high status class allows low ability subjects to set high
production targets or goals. Second, these high goals translate into high performance.
The most closely related studies are Mobius et al. (2014) and Butler (2014). Mobius
et al. (2014)’s design is aimed at investigating the evolution of subjects’ beliefs about relative
performance when they are exposed to relative performance feedback with a known random
component. They find that in deep contrast to the belief formation according to Bayes rule,
subjects exhibit asymmetry and conservativeness when updating their beliefs. However,
my paper differs in two respects. First, as mentioned above this paper elicits the beliefs
of subjects regarding their absolute performance in a task. Second, my interest lies in
performance changes caused by a unique and unanticipated status allocation, while they
focus on a environment in which there is a constant interaction between the stand on a
ranking and performance.
The paper by Butler (2014) studies how unequal performance pay in a task affects
beliefs about performance. He finds in a set of three experiments that the random assign-
ment to a treatment that yields higher performance pay bolsters confidence relative to the
performance of others, but these higher beliefs do not affect performance outcomes. The
experiment presented in this paper is different in the following aspects: 1) performance pay
is equal across conditions, 2) the source of inequality is non-financial and bears no monetary
differences, 3) I perform a measurement of initial abilities in the task to assess performance
differences for participants with similar abilities but assigned to different status classes, and
4) the accurate elicitation of beliefs was not incentivized. Additionally, in contrast to Butler
(2014), the data of this research suggest that the higher beliefs about performance lead to
higher performance.
2 The model
In this section I develop a theoretical framework for the analysis of the effect of status
on worker’s performance. In the model, status is assumed to be a random binary signal
provided by nature at the pre-production stage. Under certain conditions, the agent is able
to use these spurious signals to boost utility which in turn boosts her effort provision. I use
elements of Benabou and Tirole (2002)’s and Benabou (2015)’s game of self-deception.
The benchmark scenario
Consider a representative risk-neutral agent with a time horizon of three periods, t = 0, 1, 2.
At date 1 she chooses an effort level e ≥ 0 to be exerted in a productive task. This decision
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carries out immediate disutility, represented by c(e), a strictly increasing, quasi-convex, and
twice continuously differentiable function.
Assumption 1: ce(e) > 0, and cee(e) ≥ 0.
Moreover, she faces a pay-for-performance incentive scheme that pays, at date 2, one
monetary unit per produced output. I posit that effort is transformed into output through
the production function b(e, θi), where θi ∈ {θH , θL} is a parameter that captures whether
the agent is of a high type, θH , or whether she is of a low type, θL. For simplicity, I assume
that the production function b(e, θi) is deterministic and has a functional form that depicts
a complementarity between abilities and effort.
Assumption 2: b(e, θi) = θie.
Furthermore, the agent’s decision follows a move by nature, who provides the agent with
a pair (θi, σj) at t = 0, where the second element of this tuple represents a random status
signal σj ∈ {σH , σL}, with σH > σL. Following Scharfstein and Stein (1990), I assume that
the agent is able to differentiate informative, θi, from random, σj , signals. Thus, she is
informed about her abilities on the task before she makes a decision about her provision of
effort.
The agent’s utility at t = 0 is represented by
U0(e) = δ2θie− δc(e), (1)
where, 0 < δ < 1 represents an inter-temporal discount factor. The rational agent
chooses an effort level that satisfies the first order condition
δ2θi − δce(e∗) = 0. (2)
Where e∗ represents the optimal effort level. Note from the expression in (2) that high type
agents will provide higher effort levels than low type agents. Also note that the rational
agent disregards the random signal, σi, as it carries no economic value. This benchmark
scenario illustrates a situation in which the status signals provided at the pre-production
level do not influence the agent’s provision of effort.
A game of self-deception
In this subsection I introduce two variations with respect to the benchmark scenario. First,
the agent experiences anticipatory utility (Caplin and Leahy, 2001). In other words, she
derives utility gains at t = 1 caused by the emotions evoked from thinking about her future
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payoff level.1 I model these gains by introducing the component, E1(U2), in the agent’s
preferences.
The second variation concerns the agent’s information about her abilities, and considers
a multiple selves framework. I assume that the agent at t = 0 or Self 0 is able to send an
intrapersonal signal, θ̃i ∈ {θ̃H , θ̃L}, to Self 1. This signal may represent the frequency of true
state of nature i or the frequency of the received status signal j. The intrapersonal signal
can be thought of the outcome of a cognitive process in which Self 0 distorts the available
information about her abilities by forgetting relevant information, θi, or by rationalizing
false information, σj .
To build intuition about the incentive environment that these two variations generate,
consider the scenario in which the agent received the pair (θL, σH). In such a situation Self
0 could either send an intrapersonal signal that reflects the state of nature θ̃L or distort
information by sending an intrapersonal signal of the same frequency of the received random
signal θ̃H . Given that the she works under a pay-for-performance incentive scheme where
higher performance in the task leads to higher payments, then the anticipatory utility
E1(U2) is higher when the agent believes that she is of a high type. Thus, Self 0 is better
off distorting information and sending σ̃H . In contrast, in a scenario in which the agent
receives (θH , σL), information distortion is not desirable, and the agent is better off sending
θ̃H .
These variations provide the environment for an intra-personal game of deception in
which Self 0, whenever feasible, sends favorable signals, θ̃H , to convince Self 1 that she is of
a high type even when this may not be true. However, Self 1 is aware of this motivation and
responds by discounting these signals through an asymmetric bayesian reaction. Specifically,
when Self 1 receives a favorable signal she knows that with some probability 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 the
state of nature is in fact θL and that with probability 1−λ the state of nature is θH . Figure
1 illustrates the bayesian updating process.
Given the strategic interaction between Self 0 and Self 1, the probability that a signal
θ̃H reflects that the agent is of a high type θH is given by
p ≡ Prob(θH |θ̃H) =
q
q + (1− q)λ ,
where 0 < q < 1 represents the agent’s prior of the distribution of high types in the
organization. Thus, the anticipatory utility component of Self 1 can be written as
E1(U2) = peθH + (1− p)eθL .
1Alternatively, the source of these utility gains can be the pride or ego that the agent derives from holding










Figure 1: Self-1 Bayesian reaction to information signals θ̃i
To conclude the description of the agent’s preferences under this scenario, I assume that
distorting information carries out disutility. To keep things simple I represent these costs
by an increasing and linear function of the degree of information distortion, λ.
Assumption 3: m(λ) = mλ.
This disutility can be interpreted as the cognitive depletion experienced by the agent
from ignoring relevant information or rationalizing irrelevant information. All in all, the
objective function of Self 0 is represented by
E(U0(e, λ)) = λUD(e) + (1− λ)UT (e)−mλ, (3)
where
UT (e) = δ2eθi − δc(e) + sδeθi,
captures the utility gains when the intra-personal signal reflects the true state of nature,
and s > 0 is a parameter that weights the importance of anticipatory utility. Furthermore,
UD(e) = δ2eθi − δc(e) + sδ (peθH + (1− p)eθL) ,
is an expression that captures the utility gains when information about abilities is dis-
torted. This objective function entails that the utility gains from information distortion are
weighted by the degree in which the agent incurrs in such practice.
The rational agent exerts an optimal effort level e∗∗ which satisfies the following first
order condition with respect to effort
δ(δ + (1− λ)s)θi + δsλ (pθH + (1− p)θL)− δce(e∗∗) = 0. (4)
This expression shows that when λ is taken as a constant, agents with higher abilities θi
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exert higher effort levels. Also agents that give more weight to anticipatory utility ,s, exert
higher effort levels. Finally, higher levels of information distortion, λ, lead to higher effort
levels for low types, but lower effort levels for high types.2
Although the previous analysis took the degree of information distortion as an exoge-
nous parameter, the interest of this paper lies on situations in which the agent can choose
the extent in which she engages in information distortion. Lemma 1 demonstrates that
when such choice is available, the agent chooses to distort information when at least one
of the elements of the information pair (θi, σi) is of high frequency. Moreover, this lemma
shows that the agent never chooses to fully distort information, λ < 1.
Lemma 1: The optimal degree of information distortion chosen by the agent is
λ∗∗ ∈
{0} if (θL, σL),(0, 1), if θi = θH or σi = σH
Proof. I begin with the case in which the agent holds the information tuple (θL, σL). In
this case there are no benefits from information distortion since UT (e) = UD(e), and the
rational agent sets λ∗∗ = 0 to avoid incurring in losses in utility from m(λ).
Next I focus on the case in which the agent holds a tuple (θi, σi) where either θi = θH
or σi = σH . Define E0(U(λ)) to be the objective function, given by (3), evaluated at the
optimum e∗∗, given by (4). The envelope theorem states that
∂E (U(λ))
∂λ
= UD(e∗∗)− UT (e∗∗) + λδs
p
λ
(θHe∗∗ − θLe∗∗)−m. (5)
Hence, λ has two effects on E (U(λ)): i) it increases utility by placing more weight on
UD(e∗∗), which at the same time yields a marginal benefit λδs pλ (θHe∗∗ − θLe∗∗), and ii)
decreases utility by placing less weight on UT (e∗∗), and through the disutility derived from
the marginal cost of signal distortion m.
The shape of the function E0(U(λ)) is given by
∂2E (U(λ))
∂λ2
= −δs (e∗∗θH − e∗∗θL))
(
2q2(1− q)λ+ 1
q + (1− q)λ
)
, (6)
which is negative for all the parameters of the model. Therefore, for the scenario in
which either θH or σH , the optimal probability of distortion λ∗∗ lies in the interval (0, 1).







cee(e∗∗) > 0 if θL is the state of nature.







cee(e∗∗) < 0 if θH is the state
of nature.
9
The intuition underlying this result is as follows: If the agent holds a tuple (θL, σL),
information distortion brings no utility gains and engaging in such exercise is cognitively
costly, hence it is optimal to set λ = 0. Moreover, if the agent holds an information tuple
(θL, σH), a positive degree of information distortion, λ > 0, is beneficial since she would
experience some gains from anticipatory utility from believing that she is skilled even though
she is not. Alternatively, agents holding a signal θH could benefit from a positive degree
of information distortion, λ > 0, since they would incur in lower levels of effort disutility,
as they induce beliefs that state that they are less skilled than they are. Finally, given
the cognitive costs derived from information distortion, it is optimal that the probability of
distortion attains the boundary λ < 1.
The equilibrium of the deception game played by the selves of the agent, is described in
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: The equilibrium of the self-deception game is described by the Perfect





































Proof. I begin with the case in which the agent holds the tuple (θL, σL). Her objective
function is
E0(U(e)) = δ2eθL − δc(e) + sδ (eθL) .
The effort level that maximizes this objective function, e∗∗
θ̃L
, satisfies the following first
order condition
(δ + s)δθL − ce(e∗∗θ̂L) = 0. (7)
Moreover, for this information tuple the agent chooses not to distort information, λ∗∗
θ̃L
=
0, as stated in Lemma 1.
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I proceed to describe the equilibrium for the case in which the agent holds the tuple
(θi, σi) with θH and/or σH . The objective function in this case is described by (3). The
effort level that maximizes this objective function, referred as from here onward e∗∗
θ̃H
, satisfies
the first order condition given by (4).






This inequality holds since
sλ(pθH + (1− p)θH) + (1− λ)sθL > sθL,
is satisfied in as much as in Lemma 1 the agent with θi and/or σi chooses λ > 0.
Finally, from Lemma 1 λ∗∗
θ̃L
= 0 and λ∗∗
θ̃H




Proposition 1 depicts a situation in which the low types that received a high status
signal, σH , exert higher effort levels as compared to their counterparts with a low signal,
σL. Hence, high status could be used by the unskilled agent to believe that she is diligent,
which, provided that she works under the pay for performance incentives, leads to utility
gains and high effort provision. Furthermore, this proposition also shows that high types
receiving different status signals exert similar effort levels. Hence, skilled workers are aware
of their capabilities and do not incorporate the status signals in their belief system. To
conclude, the effort levels exerted by high types and that proportion of low types with a
medal are comparable.
3 Experimental Design and Procedures
Experiment 1
The dataset of this experiment consists of 8 sessions, conducted at CenterLab in Tilburg
University. All 136 subjects that took part in the experiment were students at the university.
On average each session lasted one hour, between 13 and 24 subjects took part in each
session, and no subject participated more than once in the experiment. I used z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007) to implement the experiment. Subjects earned on average 11.55 Euros.
The experiment aims to evaluate the effect of status on a participant’s cognitive perfor-
mance. Status is induced in the experiment with the assignment of subjects to one of two
conditions: the high status condition or Medal, in which subjects where given a medal, and
the low status condition or No Medal. This artificial status differential is taken from Eckel
11
and Ball (1996) and Ball and Eckel (1998).1
The focus on cognitive performance corresponds to the difficulty associated with changes
in performance outcomes for cognitively challenging tasks. This property allows me to
consider the results of this research as a lower bound of the effect of status on performance.
Cognitive performance was measured with the Advanced Progressive Ravens Matrices test
(APM) and the Standard Progressive Ravens test (SPM). The APM and SPM are non-
verbal tests designed to evaluate the reasoning ability of adults and adolescents (Raven,
1989). The difference between the APM and the SPM is that the former evaluates subjects
with above-average intelligence. Typically, IQ tests incorporate these matrices to measure
the fluid component of intelligence, which is the ability that the respondent has to solve
novel problems.
The APM consists of two parts: Set I and Set II, each of them used in one of the two
stages of the experiment. It was common knowledge for the subjects that the experiment
consisted of two stages. In the first stage of the experiment they had five minutes, as
recommended by Raven (1989), to complete the 12 matrices contained in Set I. Even though
performance in this part of the experiment would not pay out any monetary incentives, the
participants were endorsed by the experimenter to perform at their best ability. Finally,
private feedback about individual performance was provided once the pre-specified time to
complete the task was over.
After completion of the first part of the experiment, the participants were allocated to
one of the two status classes. This allocation was done at random, but subjects were not
informed about this assignment rule nor were deceived in any way. More information about
the details of this assignment can be found in the instructions of the experiment which can
be found in Appendix 1. Subsequently, those assigned to the Medal condition were asked
to go to the front of the laboratory room where the experimenter handed the medal and
where they received an applause from the rest of the subjects.
In the second stage of the experiment, the participants had 20 minutes to complete Set
II of the APM, which consisted of a sequence of 36 matrices, and the most difficult sets of
12 matrices of the SPM, namely set D and E.2 This pre-specified time to complete these
matrices was divided in 5 rounds. At the begining of each round the subjects were asked
to state a production target for that round. These targets where not incentivized to avoid
hedging against poor performance in the task, but the experimenter endorsed the provision
of accurate targets. Once a round was over, private feedback about individual performance
was provided.
1This artificial status differential diminishes the possibility of disagreements about standings that could
arise if a naturally occurring status difference such as gender, race or academic performance was used.
2The 20 minute timed version of the ravens matrices test is an adequate predictor of the untimed version
as Hamel and Schmittmann (2006) show.
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The earnings of each subject in the experiment were calculated by multiplying each
subject’s performance in Set II by an exchange rate. The exchange rate was determined
by the roll of a die at the end of the experiment. The participants faced with the same
probability an exchange rate of 25 Euro Cents, 50 Euro Cents or 75 Euro Cents per correctly
solved matrix. These incentives were used to avoid excessive arousal on demanding cognitive
tasks (Ariely et al., 2009).
Experiment 2
The dataset for this experiment consists of 8 experimental sessions conducted at CenterLab
in Tilburg University. All 138 subjects were students at the university. On average each
session lasted approximately one hour and between 11 and 23 subjects took part in each
session, and no subject participated more than once in the experiment. z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007) was was used to implement the experiment. Subjects earned on average 11.8 Euros.
The design of this experiment was similar to that of experiment 1, with only one differ-
ence, which was that the assignment to the conditions was determined by performance in
Set I. Subjects with higher performance outcomes in Set I than at least half of the subjects
in the same session received a medal, and the other half of the subjects in that session were
assigned to No Medal.
4 Predictions
The model proposed in Section 2 provides two competing predictions regarding the subjects’
performance in the experiment. The first prediction is based on the benchmark scenario.
Prediction 1 Performance is highest for high type agents and lowest for low type agents.
The assignment to status does not alter performance.
The first order condition in (2) displays that the high types exert higher effort as com-
pared to the low types. Given the complementarity between effort and abilities assumed
by the production function, the higher effort provision by skilled types is translated into
higher performance as compared to that associated to the low types .
The second prediction is based on the game of self-deception.
Prediction 2: Performance is highest for high types, second highest for low types in the
high status, and lowest for low types in the low status.
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Proposition 1 presents an equilibrium in which high types and those belonging to the
high status exert higher effort as compared to subjects with low skills and assigned to the
low status. Again, given the abilities-effort complementarity contained in the production
function, high ability subjects exhibit the highest levels of performance, low types in the
high status exert similar effort but exhibit lower performance and low types in the low
status exert the lowest performance levels.
5 Results
Experiment 1
I begin this section by providing a description of the binary classification of subjects em-
ployed throughout the paper. According to Raven (1989) the sequence of matrices contained
in Set I of the APM covers the full range of difficulty sampled in the SPM. In light of this
property, I use the performance outcomes in this part of the experiment to classify the
participants into two types. A participant is defined as a high type or θH if she completes
accurately more matrices in Set I than at least half of the subjects in the same session.
Moreover, an individual that fails to classify as a high type is labeled to be a low type or
θL. The participants are not aware of this classification during the experiment.
This taxonomy comprises significant differences in cognitive abilities between types. The
difference in performance between high types and low types is of 2.21 standard deviations
for Set I (p<0.001). In other words, subjects classified as high types completed correctly
26% more matrices in Set I than those subjects classified as low types.
Moreover, the data suggest that the status class allocation was done at random. There is
no empirical evidence of a difference in average performance in Set I between low types with
a medal and those without a medal (t(62)=0.159, p=0.83). Similarly, high types exhibited
no difference in performance between conditions(t(67)=1.831, p=0.071).1 Given that the
assignment to the conditions was random and that the type classification yields significant
differences in cognitive performance, a difference in performance in the second part of the
experiment for subjects with similar cognitive abilities but assigned to different conditions
is solely driven by the status class assignment.
The main finding reported in this paper is that low types that received a medal out-
performed low types that did not receive one on 26% matrices in the second stage of the
experiment (t(55.89)=-2.241, p=0.029). The effect size of this difference is gs = 0.536,
and its significance does not stem from the assumption that the underlying distribution of
1Although, the latter t-test could be interpreted as weakly significant, a possible difference between these
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Figure 2: Average performance in the second stage of the experiment by types and condition.
this difference is normal (p = 0.01, with 1000 bootstrap replications).2 Furthermore, there
is no difference in subsequent performance between high types with a medal and high types
without a medal (t(64.31)=1.234, p=0.22).
Hence, the effect of assigning low types to the high status class, provided that the
randomization was succesful, is a significant subsequent performance improvement in the
cognitively challenging task. Such improvement is large enough to even out the performance
outcomes between types, since low types with a medal exhibit similar performance levels
as high type subjects with a medal (t(58.05)=-1.048, p=0.298). In other words, low types
performed as well as high types when they were given a medal. These results support the
model of self-deception in which low ability agents that hold high status attain higher levels
of performance as compared to their counterparts in the low status class.
I perform a regression analysis with the aim to control for possible disparities in abilities
across conditions or sessions. Table 2 presents the estimates of a count data regression
of performance in the secong stage on subjects type, condition dummies, and additional
covariates. The results of the regression confirm the previous findings. First, low types
with a medal outperformed low types without a medal by 34.6 % correctly solved tables
2The statistical power of this test is 1 − β=0.73 at the 5 percent confidence level.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of performance in the second stage per experimental condition and type
Type|Condition Medal No Medal Total
θH 22.285 24.658 23.695
(7.215) ( 8.676) (8.144)
θL 24.771 19.621 22.437
(11.476) (6.630) (9.863)
Total 23.68 22.65 23.139
(9.744) ( 8.224) (8.952)
Note: This table presents the averages and standard deviations of the
performance in the second stage of the experiment by experimental con-
dition, and subject type. Standard deviations are presented in paren-
theses.
in the second stage (χ2(1)= 7.69, p=0.005).3 Also, there is no evidence of a difference in
performance between high types with or without a medal (p=0.667). Finally, once abilities
on the task are controlled for, low types with a medal outperform high types with a medal
by 27% correctly solved tables in the second stage (χ2(1)=4.36, p=0.036).
Bearing these findings in mind, it is possible to conclude that a manager can implement
status to improve the performance outcomes of those workers that lie in the lower part of
the abilities distribution. However, one may expect this effect not to be uniform across all
the subjects. To investigate the nature and existence of heterogeneous effects of the status
assignment, I momentarily abandon the binary classification of types and use score of Set I
as an, arguably, continuum measure of abilities on the task. I perform a count regression of
performance in the second stage of the experiment on performance in Set I, assignment to
the high status class and an interaction between these two variables. Table 3 presents the
estimates of the regression.
The estimates show that higher performance in Set I leads to higher performance in the
second stage of the experiment for those subjects that did not receive a medal. Particularly,
an additional correctly solved matrix in Set I leads to an increment in performance of 1.32
matrices in the second stage of the experiment, ceteris paribus. Moreover, the coefficients
associated to the dummy “medal” and its interaction with performance in Set I show that
the positive effect of the high status class on subsequent performance is stronger among
those with lower cognitive abilities as measured by Set I. For the average participant with
a medal, an additional correctly solved matrix in Set I, leads to a decrease of 2.6 correctly
solved matrices on the second stage of the experiment, ceteris paribus.
The conclusion of this heterogenous effects analysis is that subjects with lower perfor-
mance outcomes in Set I exhibit larger performance improvements when they are given the
3These calculations are based on the coefficients presented in Table 1. I use the coefficients of the variables
“Medal*θH” and “Medal” of model (3), transform each of them with the exponential function and take the
difference of these numbers to yield exp(0.231)- exp(-0.100)= 1.25-0.904=0.346.
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Table 2: Treatment Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Performance Performance Performance
θL*Medal 0.334∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗
(0.128) (0.074) (0.075)
θL -0.229∗∗ -0.227∗∗∗ -0.100
(0.082) (0.053) (0.054)
Medal -0.101 -0.103∗ -0.014
(0.081) (0.051) (0.052)
Session nr. -0.001 0.008
(0.006) (0.006)
Session Size -0.003 -0.014
(0.010) (0.010)
Mistake 1st table -0.071∗∗∗
(0.008)
Solved tasks 1st round 0.085∗∗∗
(0.007)
Constant 3.205∗∗∗ 3.265∗∗∗ 2.334∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.149) (0.177)
N 133 133 133
pseudo R2 0.023 0.024 0.180
Note: This table presents the estimates of the Poisson regression of the model Perfomancei = β0 +β1θL ∗
Medal+β2θL+β3Medal+Controls′Γ+εi, with ε ∼ poisson(λ). “Perfomance” is the number of correctly
solved matrices in the second stage of the experiment, “Medal” is a dummy variable that captures whether
the subject was assigned to the high status, and “thetaL” is a dummy variable that captures whether the
subject was classified as having low cognitive abilities. The controls considered in this model are “Session
nr.” a variable that captures the session order of the experiment, “Session Size” which captures the number
of subjects in the session, “Mistake 1st Table” a variable that captures the number of mistakes in the first
round, and“Solved tasks 1st round” captures the number of answers in the first round. Robust standard
errors presented in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0.001 level, ** denotes significance at the
0.01 level, * denotes significance at the 0.05 level.
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Table 3: Heterogenous Treatment Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Performance Performance Performance
Score Set I 0.0960∗∗∗ 0.0957∗∗∗ 0.0593∗∗
(3.41) (4.98) (3.08)
Medal 1.351∗∗ 1.362∗∗∗ 1.171∗∗∗
(3.22) (5.62) (3.44)
Score Set I * Medal -0.144∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗
(-3.21) (-5.46) (-3.36)
Session nr. -0.000992 0.000383
(-0.18) (0.06)
Session Size -0.00468 -0.00634
(-0.50) (-0.52)




Solved tasks 1st round 2.229∗∗∗ 2.316∗∗∗ 1.718∗∗∗
(8.50) (10.03) (6.08)
Observations 136 136 136
pseudo R2 0.031 0.031 0.182
Note: This table presents the estimates of the Poisson regression of the model Perfomancei = β0 +
β1θL ∗Medal+ β2θL + β3Medal+Controls′Γ + εi, with ε ∼ poisson(λ). “Perfomance” is the number of
correctly solved matrices in the second stage of the experiment, “Set I ” is the number of correctly solved
matrices in the first stage of the experiment, “thetaL” is a dummy variable that captures whether the
subject was classified as having low cognitive abilities. The controls considered in this model are “Session
nr.” a variable that captures the session order of the experiment, “Session Size” which captures the number
of subjects in the session,“Mistake 1st Table” a variable that captures the number of mistakes in the first
round, and “Solved tasks 1st round” captures the number of answers in the first round. Robust standard
errors presented in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0.001 level, ** denotes significance at the
0.01 level, * denotes significance at the 0.05 level.
18
high status class as compared to more skilled subjects. Hence, a manager implementing a
status assignment in which high status is provided randomly, can expect that those workers
with lower abilities in the productive task will experience higher performance improvements
from receiving the high status.
A natural question arising from the results presented in this subsection is whether the
provision of medals is in fact the driver of the boost in performance exhibited by the lowest
performers, or whether this is due to other confounding factors such as the difference in
extrinsic incentives between the second stage and the first stage of the experiment that
motivated some of the low types. If the high status class is indeed leading these effects,
restricting the provision of medals to high ability subjects must lead to an underperformance
of low types in the stage two. With the aim to investigate this conjecture I perform a second
experiment which is presented in the next subsection.
Experiment 2
The second experiment aims to evaluate cognitive performance when high status is given
exclusively to the high types. The goal of this experiment is to show that this meritocratic
environment would lead to a difference in subsequent performance between types that orig-
inates from the initial disparity in cognitive abilities. Such result would support the main
finding of the paper: the boost in performance exhibited by low types in Experiment 1 is
achieved solely through the provision of high status to these subjects.
As in the previous subsection, I show that the binary types classification entails large
differences in cognitive performance between high and low types. The difference in average
performance between low types and high types in the first stage of the experiment is 2.31
standard deviations (p<0.001), with high types solving correctly 29% more matrices than
low types.
Furthermore, the data suggest that in the second stage of the experiment, high types
outperformed low types by 13% correctly solved matrices in the second stage of the exper-
iment (t(130.32)=-2.371, p=0.019). This difference in performance is of the magnitude of
0.407 standard deviations (gs=.407, p=0.015 with 1000 bootstrap replications). Hence, in
a meritocratic environment, low types exhibit lower performance with respect to high types.
This result could be seen as a proof of concept illustrating that low types underperform
high types on the second stage of the experiment, unless the are provided with the high
status class.
The two experiments presented in this paper show that subjects with low cognitive
abilities experience a boost in subsequent performance when they are assigned to the high
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Figure 3: Average performance in the second stage of Experiment 2 by types and condition
levels in the second stage of the experiment under the two status allocations, meritocratic
or random assignment. Hence, his preferences for income distribution determine the status
allocation choice.
Experiment comparison
A comparison between the performance outcomes from the second stage of Experiment 1
and Experiment 2 is presented. Figure 4 shows that there is no difference in performance
outcomes between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 (t(264.6)=0.580, p=0.562). This, along
with the results of the previous subsections, implies that the improvement displayed by low
types when they are given a medal, by construction in the random status allocation, comes
at no performance loss or gain for the principal. Hence, in a situation in which he is able
to choose the mechanism of status allocation, he would do so on the basis of his preferences
for income distribution. Specifically, a principal with strong preferences for income equality
among the workers, would prefer the random status assignment as it allows a proportion of
the low types to bear earnings comparable to those accomplished by the high types.
Furthermore, in the spirit of a robustness check, I evaluate the consistency of some of
the most relevant findings of the paper across experiments. First, I find that low types
with a medal, by construction belonging to Experiment 1, exhibit 10% higher subsequent
performance than low types in Experiment 2 (t(104=-1.29), p=0.09). Thus, the main result
of the paper holds across experiments. Additionally, high types in Experiment 2 and low
types with a medal exhibit no significant difference in performance in the second stage of
the experiment (t(50.81)=0.309, p=0.758). This is consistent with the finding that the
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Figure 4: Average performance in the second stage by experiment
attain performance levels similar to those reached by high types. Finally, high types in
Experiment 2 outperform low types without a medal in Experiment 1 (t(61.96)= 3.738,
p<0.001), which confirms the result of Experiment 2; the meritocratic provision of medals
maintains the differences in cognitive abilities between types in the second stage of the
experiment.
6 Beliefs about performance
In this section, I provide evidence that among the high types, those with high status exhibit
higher beliefs about personal performance. This finding supports the self-deception model,
since it demonstrates that individuals that have certain level of skills in a task and exposed
to constant feedback throughout the experiment, incorporate the status class in their belief
system.
In the experiment a goal or production target is elicited at the begining of each experi-
mental round. This goal represents the subject’s beliefs about her or his future performance
in that round. Moreover given the pay-for-performance incentive scheme, a goal can also
be interpreted as the subject’s expectations about her future earnings or, in the light of
the model, anticipatory utility, E1(b(e, θi)). Hence, significant differences in goal setting
between agents with similar initial cognitive skills but assigned to different conditions, sug-
gest that status affects the subject’s expectations about future earnings, and in turn her
anticipatory utility.
I start by analyzing the aggregated goal level, which is the sum of the elicited goals
over the five rounds of the second stage. Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of this
variable. I find that low types without a medal set on average 15% lower goals that high
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of aggregated goal in the second stage per experimental condition and type
Type| Condition Medal No Medal Total
θH 31.285 31.804 31.594
( 8.944) (8.721) (8.793)
θL 29.8 27.620 28.81
(8.442) (9.484) (10.458)
Total 32.161 29.559 31.691
( 9.240 ) (9.113) (9.249)
Note: This table presents the averages and standard deviations of aggre-
gated goal in the second stage of the experiment by experimental con-
dition, and subject type. Standard deviations are presented in paren-
theses.
types without a medal (t(54.29)=1.749, p=0.043). Besides, low types assigned to the medal
exhibit similar aggregated goal levels as those elicited by the high types without a medal
(t(57.15)=0.68, p=0.49). Thus, the high status lead low type subjects to set goal levels that
are as high as those set by the high types.
Based on the theoretical framework, this difference in goal setting caused by the status
assignment cannot be explained by the benchmark scenario, where subjects know their
abilities on the task and thus their belief system is not altered by the status signal. However,
the self-deception scenario accounts for this difference. In such an environment, individuals
use status to believe that they are better performers than they are. This goal setting
difference between low types provides evidence that i) these subjects believe that they
are better than they are when given the high status and ii) if individuals incorporate an
anticipatory utility component in their preferences, these higher beliefs lead to utility gains.
I proceed to study the goal level elicited in each round with the aim of understanding
the dynamics of aggregated goals. I am particularly interested in investigating whether
the difference in aggregated goal setting between low types in the high status class and
low types in the low class appears in the first round. Such a finding would indicate that
the assignment to the status class has an immediate effect on a subject’s beliefs about her
performance. Table 5 shows that there are no differences in the initial goal level between
low types with a medal and low types without a medal (t(60.829)=-0.861, p=0.392). I
conjecture, that this result stems from the uncertainty faced by subjects with regard to
their abilities, e.g. not being able to predict how well they will perform in the task as they
have been performing it for a relatively short time, and the difficulty of the task in the
second stage of the experiment.
Although the differences in beliefs about performance do not appear immediately, Table
5 also shows that there are goal setting differences between conditions for low types in
round 3 (t(52.046)=-1.819, p= 0.03), round 4 (t( 59.678)=-1.239, p=0.110) and round 5
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Figure 5: Average aggregated goal in the second stage of the experiment by types and
condition.
Table 5: Goal level by round and by condition for the low types
Type θL θL θH θH
Condition Medal No Medal Medal No Medal
Goalr=1 7.228 8.103 7.804 8.428
(2.880) (4.369) ( 4.539) (4.590)
Goalr=2 8.542 8 8.464 9.463
( 2.582) (2.449) ( 1.971) ( 2.079)
Goalr=3 6.285 5.310 6.560 6.785
(1.824) (2.361) (2.549) (2.079)
Goalr=4 4.371 3.724 4.464 4.634
(2.073) ( 2.085) ( 1.815) (2.130)
Goalr=5 3.3714 2.482 3.142 3.341
( 2.498) ( 1.882) ( 1.603) ( 2.220)
Goalr 5.96 5.524 6.257 6.345
(3.029) (3.549) (.285) (.259)
Note: This table presents the averages and standard deviations of goals in the second
stage of the experiment by experimental condition and round for those subjects classified
as low types. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses.
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Table 6: Goal dynamics for the low types
(1) (2) (3)
Sample θL θL*Medal=1 θL*Medal=0
Goalr Goalr Goalr
Goalr−1 0.426∗∗ 0.559∗∗ 0.295
(2.74) (3.09) (1.51)
Performancer−1 0.461∗ 0.461∗∗∗ 0.471∗
(2.49) (3.55) (2.01)
Session nr. 0.465 -0.562 0.309
(0.44) (-0.47) (0.40)
SessionSize 1.079 -1.587 0.476
(0.89) (-0.37) (0.54)
Matrices r = 1 -1.242 0.944 -0.317
(-0.96) (0.30) (-0.67)
Constant -4.610 16.28 -4.629
(-0.19) (0.35) (-0.31)
Observations 256 140 116
Note: This table presents the estimates of the Blundell and Bond regression of the model
Goalri = α0 + α1Goal(r−1)i + α2Performance(r−1),i +Controls
′Γ + εi. “Goal” is a
subject’s beliefs about the number of correctly solved patrices in round r. “Perfomance” is
the number of correctly solved matrices in a round in the second stage of the experiment.
The controls considered in this model are “Session nr.” a variable that captures the
session order of the experiment, “Session Size” which captures the number of subjects
in the session, “Mistake 1st Table” a variable that captures the number of mistakes
in the first round and “Solved tasks 1st round” which captures the number of answers
in the first round. t-test with clustered standard errors presented in parentheses. ***
denotes significance at the 0.001 level, ** denotes significance at the 0.01 level, * denotes
significance at the 0.05 level.
counterparts in No Medal. Hence, the difference in aggregated goals between conditions
is caused by differences in goal setting in the last rounds of the experiment. This result
suggests that there is a relevant role of status assignment on feedback assessment and
task experience, which in turn affects goal setting in the last rounds. Specifically, one can
hypothesize that subjects in the high status condition assimilate performance feedback more
optimistically and hence set higher and more difficult goals.
To investigate how the goal levels are affected by performance feedback and task ex-
perience, I perfom a Blundell and Bond dynamic panel data regression of a round’s goal
on its lagged variable, assignment to the Medal condition, lagged performance and covari-
ates that capture abilities on the task. The advantage of the Blundell and Bond technique
coMpared to an ordinary least squares regression is that is that it allows the error term
and the unobservable individual characteristics to be correlated which is to be expected in
this statistical model given the limited demographic information in the dataset. Table 6
presents the estimation output of the regression.
The estimates show two relevant patterns: first, low types in both conditions adjust goals
upwards by a similar amount in reaction to performance in the previous round (χ2(1)=2.86,
p=0.377). Status did not affect the way in which subjects assessed performance feedback
and incorporated this information into their beliefs. Second, only subjects with a medal
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exhibit goal state dependence. In other words, low types in the high status adjust goals
upwards in reaction to the previous-round goal level, whereas their counterparts in the low
status class do not exhibit such behavior. Thus, high status, irrespective of performance
through the experiment, leads participants to exhibit steeper goal trends over the rounds.
The results are suggestive of a difference in goal setting strategy between conditions.
Low ability subjects assigned to the high status class set, in each round, higher goals as
compared to their previous-round’ goals. This can be seen as these subjects challenging
themselves to achieve a higher target as compared to the one sat in the previous round.
Whereas low types assigned to the low status class not exhibit such upward trend in goal
setting. Hence, the higher aggregated goal levels of subjects in the high status, originate
from their challenging-seeking behavior in each round.
This difference in goal setting strategies induced by the status assignment, could also
explain the performance difference presented in the previous section. In the light of the goal
setting theory, a challenging goal boosts performance in physicial and cognitive tasks (Wu
et al., 2008). Hence, even though both groups hold the same abilities on the task as measured
by performance ourtcomes in Set I, only those holding the high status set challenging goals,
or goals that surpassed the previous-goal level, which lead to higher performance.
As a conclusion it is possible to state that the assignment to the high status class affected
the the low types’ beliefs about their future performance. These participants exhibited pro-
duction targets that were as high as those elicited by the high types. Thus, they believed,
in spite of having relevant information about their abilities, that they were not bad per-
formers. Hence, as in the self-deception scenarion, the high status signal was internalized
by these subjects as part of their predictions about their performance. Furthermore, these
higher productions targets stemmed from their higher challenge-seeking behavior in each
round.
7 Conclusion
I studied the effect of an incentive device incorporating status on the workers’ performance.
Special attention was devoted to the effect of this device on agents with high or low abilities
on the productive task. A random allocation of the high status inherent to the incentive
scheme allowed me to perform such analysis. The theoretical framework shows that, under
certain conditions over her preferences, the representative agent engages in a game of self-
deception wherein favorable status signal realizations are used to believe that she is skilled
even when she is not. The equilibrium of this self-deception game describes that agents
that engage in a positive degree of self-deception also exhibit high perfomance levels.
The predictions of the model are tested in a controlled laboratory setting. The data
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suggest that agents classified as low types exhibit higher performance outcomes when they
are assigned to the high status condition. Further analysis shows that these agents also
incorporate an eventual assignment to the high status condition in their belief system;
when allocated to the high status, they believe that they are good performers, even when
constant feedback about their performance is given. Moreover, high ability subjects exhibit
high performance and high performance beliefs irrespective of their status class. These
results support the self-deception scenario in which distort relevant information whenever
it is convenient.
My findings have clear management implications: First, managers can target the low
skilled employees and benefit from a boost in their performance outcomes by implementing
a status incentive device in which they are given a high status class. Second, a random
assignment of the high status class induces more equal performance outcomes across the
workforce. Third, the managers are indifferent between this random status allocation and
a meritocratic status allocation when their choice is based on average performance compar-
isons between these two systems.
A natural question is whether the implementation of the status allocations is feasible
in an organisation. According to the data, the main advantage of the provision of medals
to low ability subjects is that they exhibit an improvement in performance. However, to
maintain this effect, high status must be desirable, requiring a meritocratic mechanism
attached to their assignment. A possible approach to solve this paradox is the method
used by Neckermann et al. (2014), who allocated status awards on the basis of a variable
that was uncorrelated to the performance outcome but that benefited low ability workers.
A manager using such a method is able to motivate low ability workers and maintain the
desirability of the award.
Although I focused on an agency setting, the findings contained in this research should
not only be interpreted only through such lens. This study could also lean support to the
literature focusing on social disadvantage and performance. As in Hoff and Pandey (2006),
this paper shows that making salient the membership of a low status class leads to low
performance and lower beliefs about one’s capacities. However, the framework considered
here uses a short-lived artificial status differential and a cognitively challenging task, thus,
the results exposed in this study can be interpreted as a more stringent test for the effect
of social status salience on performance outcomes.
My findings can be linked to the recent literature that investigates the effects of scarcity
on cognitive performance. As in ?, I show that the prominence of scarce resources, in this
paper making salient that the subject has scarce cognitive resources to execute a task, leads
to lower average performance in the Raven’s matrices test. Thus, this study can be seen as
a proof of principle that making prominent one’s lack of abilities to execute a task dampens
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cognitive performance.
Future research should focus on repeated environments that allow status re-assignments.
The proposed approach could shed light on whether the performance improvements dis-
played by the low ability participants in this paper hold in subsequent meritocratic envi-
ronments. Such hypothetical result would enhance the importance of the present research,
as disadvantaged managers could benefit from the improvement of low skilled workers in a
one shot and cost-efficient policy.
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Mimeo.
Experimental Instructions
Part 1 of the Experiment
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. The instructions are simple
and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable
amount of money, which will be paid to you via bank transfer at the end of the experiment.
The amount of payment that you receive depends entirely on your decisions and your effort.
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Once the experiment has started, no one is allowed to talk to anybody other than the
experimenter. Anyone who violates this rule will lose his or her right to participate in this
experiment. If you have further questions when reading these instructions please do not
hesitate to raise your hand and formulate the question to the experimenter.
In the first part of the experiment we will ask you to solve a set of 12 tasks, in each of
the tasks you are asked to complete a pattern, to do so, you need to choose among some
of the options that we provide. Remember that only one of the options is correct. In this
part of the experiment you have 4 minutes in order to complete the set of 12 tasks. With
the completion of this task we will place you in one of two groups.
At the beginning of this part of the experiment we will ask you to provide a personal
goal or target, this is we would like you to estimate how many patterns you would be able
to solve in that round. Please provide this goal at your best ability! We would really like
to know how accurate your estimates are.
(Completion set I, approximately 6 minutes)
The following people have a position in the GOLD group. (Call out ID numbers). Please
come up as we call your name and receive your medal. You will wear your medal for the
rest of the exercise. Please remain standing at the front of the room until all stars are
distributed. Let’s give the Gold group a round of applause!
Part 2 of the Experiment
In the second part of the experiment you are asked to solve patterns just like the ones
that you completed in the first part of this experiment. You need to solve as many patterns
as you can, since for each correctly solved pattern you would receive a certain amount of
points, which can be exchanged for money at the end of the experiment. Hence the money
that you earn in the exercise depends on your performance in this part of the experiment.
During this part of the experiment you have 5 rounds, each of 4 minutes, to complete
as many patterns as you can. Feedback about your own performance, this is whether you
solved correctly a pattern or not, would be given to you as soon as you solved that pattern.
A summary of the number of correctly solved and incorrectly solved patterns in the round
would be given to you as soon as the round ends.
Your final score, this is the amount of points derived from each round, would only be
shown to you at the end of the experiment. The exchange rate at which the points can be
exchanged for money would be determine by the roll of a dice done by the experimenter at
the moment of payment. Numbers (1,2) of the dice would imply and exchange rate of 25
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Euro cents per point, numbers (3,4) would imply an exchange rate of 5 per Euro cents per
point and numbers (5,6) would imply an exchange rate of 75 Euro cents per point.
At the beginning of each round we will ask you to provide a personal goal or target,
this is we would like you to estimate how many patterns you would be able to solve in that
round. Please provide this goal at your best ability! we would really like to know how
accurate are your estimates.
(Completion set II, approximately 25 minutes)
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